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1. Introduction 
After “Zou Chu Qu” (overseas expansion) that was clearly ranked as a 
national strategy of the Chinese government in 2001, the outward foreign 
expansion of Chinese firms rapidly expanded. Chinese FDI flows were 50 bn. 
Dollars per year from 2008, and in 2015 it reached 145.7 bn. Dollars. China has 
also become the second biggest foreign direct investment (FDI) country in the 
world. As of the end of 2015, 20,200 Chinese firms had established 30,800 
companies in foreign countries, and these companies expanded into 188 
countries and regions 1). Chinese FDI in stock was 2 trillion dollars, and the 
total overseas assets was 4.73 trillion dollars at the end of 2015 (Ministry of 
Commerce of Republic of China, et al. “The Official Report of Chinese Firms 
FDI, 2015”).  
Not only is the outward foreign expansion of Chinese firms mostly influences 
by the Chinese government, but individual companies have these expansion 
desires also, as they have their own private motivations and intentions, too. 
This paper focuses on the top 2 Chinese ICT equipment firm cases – Huawei 
& ZTE co. Ltd. It will make clear the features of overseas expansion with 
Chinese multinational enterprises (CMNE). With this, the research will 
explicate the common features of emerging countries’ multinational enterprises 
(EMNE) in their outward foreign expansion. Also, some implications from this 
research will be anticipated.  
 
2. Earlier Literature Review 
So far, there is much literature regarding the features of CMNE’s overseas 
expansion. For instance, the “Multi purposes’ approach” (UNCTAD, 2006) that 
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analyzed the Chinese enterprises’ motives for becoming MNEs; “12 Hypotheses” 
(Peter Buckley et al., 2007) that analyzed the decision factors of Chinese 
enterprises’ outward foreign expansion. Chinese researchers, such as Liu, Lee 
& Liu etc. presented the “Reverse Technology Spillover Hypothesis” (2009, 
2012), and Wang Zhi Le et al. organized the Annual Report of the main CMNE’s 
overseas expansion, and so forth. 
In Japan, researchers such as Amano & Ohki (2001, 2014), Marukawa & 
Nakagawa (2008), Takahashi (2008), Kawai (2013), Hatori (2013), Nakagawa 
(2012, 2013) and Natsume et al. (2017) etc. analyzed the background, the real 
conditions, the structural valuation and the management strategies of the 
CMNEs, respectively. 
Based on earlier literature, the outward strategies of CMNEs is organized 
into three categories; “variety for their process”, “multiple layers for their 
purpose and preferences” and “peculiarity for the CMNEs”. Especially the 
“peculiarity for the CMNEs” is expressed as the “3 Reverse Phenomena” (LIU, 
2014). Meanwhile the strategy of CMNEs’ overseas expansion is described as 
the “Reverse Direction Strategy” in this paper. 
The sample companies of the “3 Reverse Phenomena” are as follows; 
Getting the specific advantages from foreign countries in advance as Lenovo 
did, which is the no.1 PC maker in China; Choosing tough target markets such 
as developed markets to expand in the first stage of overseas expansion rather 
than choosing more accommodating markets like the developing markets and 
lower MOP (Middle of the Economic Pyramid) to advance as Haier did, which 
is the top maker of consumer electrical appliances in China; Targeting the BOP 
(Base of the Economic Pyramid) and lower MOP consumer layers in the 
beginning of overseas expansion rather than targeting the TOP (Top of the 
Economic Pyramid) and upper MOP consumer layers at the first stage of 
overseas expansion as Huawei and ZTE did, which are the top 2 ICT equipment 
enterprises in China. Chart 1. shows this reverse phenomena. (See Figure 1) 
 
3. ICT Equipment Industry and its Main Firms in China 
 3-1. “8 Communications’ Systems from 7 Countries” – under the controlling 
world powers 
“8 Communications’ Systems from 7 Countries” meant that the Chinese ICT 
market was controlled by 8 kinds of communications systems from 7 countries 
during the 1980’s through to the 1990’s. These systems and controlling 
countries were Fujitsu & NEC from Japan, Ericsson from Sweden, Siemens 
from Germany, Bell Communication Industrial co. Ltd. from Belgium, Alcatel 
from France, AT&T from USA and Northern Telecom from Canada. 
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   *DMNE: Developed Countries’ MNE  *EMNE: Emerging Countries’ MNE 
Figure 1. The Image of Reverse Phenomena 
 
 3-2. The “Big 4” – JuLong, DaTang, ZTE, Huawei – Came into Being 
The Chinese government saw the “8 Communications’ Systems from 7 
Countries” as a “tuition fee”, because there were not any respectable ICT 
industries in China at that time. This led to the Chinese feeling a sense of 
humiliation due to this situation. From the second half of 1980’s, more than 
400 communication equipment firms came into being in China within a short 
period of time. These firms included state enterprises, private firms and joint 
ventures. These “new” firms had to compete with the world powers which have 
a long history and strong competitive advantages and were from Western 
countries and Japan, so finally these Chinese enterprises ended up going 
bankrupted. 
While most Chinese communication equipment companies disappeared from 
the market, only 4 companies were an exception. They were called the “Big 4”, 
which included Julong Communications, it’s first president was Wu Jiang Xing 
who successfully developed the big capacity digital switchboard HJD04 in 
China. Datang Telecom, the founder, Zhou Huan who once worked for the 
Chinese government and used to be a director of the Science & Technology 
Bureau in the Ministry of Posts & Telecommunications. ZTE, it’s founder, Hou 
Wei Gui who used to be the vice president of a state company that belonged to 
the Ministry of Aviation & Universe. Huawei Technology, it’s founder, Rei 
Zheng Fei who once was a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officer. These 4 
companies shouldered the expectations of the Chinese government and its 
people, and finally created fierce competition with the world powers in China. 
In the end, they managed to gain a stable position in the Chinese market 2). 
TOP
MOP
BOP
* DMNEs:  EMNEs:  
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 3-3. From “Big 4” to “Big 2” 
After the fierce competition, Julong and Datang that started as state firms 
became smaller, however Huawei & ZTE that are market directional 
companies became bigger. In the Chinese communications equipment industry, 
the “big 2”—Huawei and ZTE were beginning to become a huge presence in the 
Chinese ICT equipment market. Furthermore, beyond people’s expectations, 
Huawei & ZTE became the top runners in the ICT infrastructure industry in 
the world after only 15 years. (See Table 1 and Figure 2) 
 
Table 1. The Market Share Ranking of World Mobile Communications  
Equipment Enterprises (as of the first quarter of 2009) 
Ranking Firms Market share 
1 Ericsson 33% 
2 Nokia・Siemens 21% 
3 Huawei Technology 15% 
4 Alcatel・Lucent 14% 
5 Northern Telecom 10% 
6 Motorola 8% 
7 ZTE 5.68% 
Source: Huang Li Jun & Cheng Dong Sheng (2010) p.55. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: From the Annual Report of Huawei, Ericsson and ZTE, Respectively. 
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4. The Outward Foreign Investment of Huawei 
 4-1. The History of Huawei 
In 1987, Huawei was established in Shen Zhen, the first Special Economic 
Zone in China. In the beginning, Huawei was just a distributor for a Hong Kong 
firm, which manufactures the private branch exchange (PBX) for call 
extensions in companies and ISDN for telephone office. After technology 
developed, Huawei began to manufacture and sell its original PBX’s for hotels 
and the small and medium sized companies that were located in rural areas. 
Huawei also started to manufacture the automatic switchboard and made a 
great achievement in the rural markets. 
The first switchboard that Huawei developed was the JK1000, which was 
half digital and half machinery. After 6 months, Huawei started to develop the 
automatic switchboard and successfully developed the automatic switchboard, 
C&C08, which contained 2000 lines. Following these successes, Huawei 
developed a switchboard which included 10,000 lines. In urban areas in China, 
however, the market for switchboards in telephone offices was still under the 
control of Shanghai Bell (America) & Alcatel (France) in the 1990’s in China. 
 
 4-2. Domestic Marketing Strategy of Huawei 
First of all, Huawei made a strategy called “From Rural to City”. Developed 
countries’ multinational enterprises (DMNE) such as Shanghai Bell were not 
interested in the rural areas, because the markets were far smaller. Meanwhile, 
Huawei went into the rural markets and offered a good service to the telephone 
offices in the counties and even the villages, therefor they grasped the rural 
markets firmly.  
Huawei was not satisfied with only obtaining the rural markets, so they took 
the next step to encroach upon the urban areas which were the DMNEs’ 
territory at that time. The specific advantages of Huawei were its lower prices 
and higher quality services. Furthermore, Huawei advanced its technology and 
promoted its ICT equipment for digital, high speed and multi-medias. 
Meanwhile, following the world trend, which was switchboards changing to 
routers, Huawei finally appeared at the front of the ICT equipment industry. 
(See Figure 3) 
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Source: Huawei’s Annual Report 2005 through 2016  
 
 4-3. The Contents of the Overseas Expansion Strategy of Huawei 
From the latter half of the 1990s, Huawei started to expand into the overseas 
markets. We can find much research regarding the process of Huawei’s 
outward expansion, and through this process Huawei became a multi-national 
company. Huawei itself views its outward expansion in 3 steps: first, exporting 
its products to the former Soviet Union, Eastern European countries and Africa 
countries, then establishing maintenance based in these countries. Second, 
expanding into European countries and building R&D centers in many of these 
countries. Finally, advancing into the Japanese and the American market. 
At the first stage, Huawei used its domestic marketing strategy which is 
called “From Rural to City” to expand its global markets in developing 
countries and the countries with economies in transition. As of 2006, Huawei’s 
market share of ICT equipment was 13.7% in CIS, 27.8% in the Middle East 
and Northern Africa, 26.2% in Southern Africa, 7.7% in Asia and Pacific area 
and 9.7% in Latin America 3). 
In the second stage, Huawei began to advance into the American and 
European markets grounded by the experience of expanding into developing 
countries and the countries with economies in transition. After carrying out 
M&A’s in the Northern America market and then being caught up in several 
lawsuits, Huawei began to shift its focus to the European market. Optical 
communications system STM 64 is used practically at Germany’s PFTLZKOM 
& BERLICOM in 2000, and Huawei obtained the sales contract of the main 
transfer line in France in 2003 4). 
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In the finally stage, Huawei advanced into the American market again and 
the Japanese market. In middle of August of 2008, Huawei got a contract – the 
third generation (3G) mobile communication system CDMA2000 1X and 
communication system EV-DO Rev. A, from Leap, a new mobile communication 
carrier, and built the system in California, Idaho and Nevada states. Besides 
mobile communication, Leap also offered the multi-communication service at a 
low price. It was said that the software switch and IP based wireless station 
from Huawei was 60% lower in price than what was currently being used. 
Huawei advanced into Japan from the beginning of this century. In 2002, the 
Tokyo office of Huawei opened. In 2005, the subsidiary, Huawei Japan was 
established. In 2011, Huawei Japan became a member of the Japan Business 
Federation (Keidanren) 5). 
 
 4-4. The Features of the Overseas Expansion Strategy of Huawei 
The remarkable feature of the overseas expansion strategy of Huawei is its 
“From Rural to City” strategy. That means beginning in the rural markets then 
working its way up to urban areas. This strategy was a big success in the 
domestic market. Using the same strategy, Huawei began to advance into the 
overseas markets, firstly the markets in developing countries and regions 
where the incomes are lower. Then Huawei expanded into developed countries 
such as Germany, France, the USA and Japan; these countries having both 
advanced technology and high average incomes. 
Today, Huawei has been supplying its products and services not only to 
clients like China Telecom, China Mobile, China Network Communications 
Group, China Unicom, etc. which are all major communications carriers in 
China, but also to clients like British Telecom, AIS, Telefonica, Singapore 
Telecom, Deutsche Telecom, TeliaSonera, etc. which are all major 
communications carriers abroad. Huawei has become the top enterprise in the 
ICT equipment industry in the world since 2013. (See Figure 4) 
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Source: The Annual Reports of Huawei, Ericsson and ZTE (2012-2016) 
 
5 The Overseas Expansion of ZTE 6) 
 5-1. The History and Outline of ZTE 
ZTE was founded in Shen Zhen in 1985. Unlike Huawei, ZTE started as a 
state possession company. In 1997, ZTE listed in the A Stock Section on the 
Shen Zhen Stock Exchange, and after 7 years, ZTE listed in the H Stock Section 
on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. As of the end of 2016, 81.95% of the shares 
were A stock and 18.05% of the shares were H stock among ZTE’s equities 
capital. 
The main shareholder of ZTE is Zhong Xing Xin (ZXX), its share being 
30.35% in ZTE. ZXX is a state controlled company and its shareholders are 
Xi’An Microelectronics (34%), Guang Yu Aerospace (17%), and Zhong Xing Wei 
Xian Tong (ZXWXT, 49%). Of the 3 shareholders in ZXX, Xi’An Microelectronics 
and Guang Yu Aerospace are state companies, and ZXWXT is a private 
company. Apart from ZXX, others shareholders of ZTE are mostly institutional 
investors and individual investors, and these total shares account for 69.65%. 
At Feb. 28 of 2017, trading free stock and trading restrictive stock in ZTE was 
99.88% and 0.12%, respectively. 
As of 2016, there were 81,468 employees working for ZTE, and the average 
age of the employees was 32 years old. Among the employees, 36.93% of 
employees worked in R&D. There are 20 R&D centers located in China and 
other countries, 7 research centers are distributed in America, France, Sweden, 
Japan and Canada, respectively. Up to September 31 of 2016, ZTE have 
submitted more than 68,000 applications for patents to PCT, and 28,000 have 
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been permitted to be used. From 2012, ZTE stayed in the top 3 positions for the 
number of applications of patents to PCT continually 7). The sales figures of 
ZTE from 2006 through to 2016 was RMB 23.2 bn., 34.7 bn., 44.2 bn., 60.2 bn., 
70.2 bn., 86.4 bn., 84.2 bn., 75.2 bn., 81.5 bn., 100.2 bn., 101.2 bn., respectively. 
(See Figure 5.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ZTE’s Annual Report From 2012 to 2016. 
 
The sales in ZTE decreased from 2012 due to the influence of the financial 
crisis in 2007-2008. The influence to ZTE, however, was not as serious 
compared to the American and European ICT companies. From 2014 the sales 
in ZTE rose again, and in 2015 their sales reached over 100 million RMB for 
the first time in its history. 
Today, in 2017, ZTE provides its services to communication carriers and 
company clients in over 160 countries and areas. The smart phone unit sales is 
ranked as 10th in the world (as of 2016), and 4th in the American market. ZTE 
is called “the leading company for intelligent cities”, and the “ZTE” brand has 
now become a world famous brand. 
 
 5-2. The Phases of Overseas Expansion of ZTE 
 ① Phase of searching for overseas markets (1995–1997) 
In this phase, ZTE was mostly learning the international business rules in 
the overseas markets and accumulating experience from overseas expansion. 
ZTE exported its products to Indonesia and Malaysia during this term, however, 
the scale was rather limited. 
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 ② Phase of expanding to overseas markets (1998 – 2001) 
In this phase, ZTE began to enter into the overseas market full-scale. Besides 
southern Asia and Africa, ZTE made a considerable deal by exporting its ICT 
equipment to the former Yugoslavia during this term. 
 ③ Phase of widening the scope of overseas expansion (2002–2004) 
In this phase, ZTE reinforced its overseas expansion in markets, in human 
resources and in capitals omnidirectional. By entering into the emerging 
markets like India, Russia, Brazil and so forth, ZTE also made a base by 
advancing into the developed markets, like America and Europe. 
 ④ Phase of advancing into developed markets (After 2005) 
ZTE focused on the developed markets such as America, Europe and Japan 
after 2005 and made many alliances with the world communication’s carriers. 
ZTE provided its products (including ICT equipment, smart-phones units and 
software) to Vodafone (UK), Telefonica (Spain), Telstra (Australia), Softbank 
(Japan), etc. These are all famous communication carriers in the world. 
Furthermore, ZTE opened its Japan office in 2005, and established its 
subsidiary – ZTE Japan Co. Ltd. in 2008. 
 
 5-3. The Contents of Overseas Expansion of ZTE 
 ① Expanding the Markets Globally 
After developing the developing markets in Asia, Africa and Latin America, 
ZTE began to focus on expanding the markets in America, Europe and Japan. 
Meanwhile, ZTE started to increase its brand value and gain world recognition. 
 ② International HRM 
The core content of corporate culture in ZTE is its human resource 
management (HRM). During the process of overseas expansion, ZTE trained a 
lot of employees who had the skills for international business, and employed 
the talented local people for their overseas subsidiary companies. 
 ③ Raising money from the capital market 
ZTE listed on both the Shen Zhen Stock Exchange and the main board of 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The management of ZTE was strictly monitored 
by its shareholders, so it made its business administration very transparent. 
ZTE attempted to take the best practice in its corporate governance through 
offering shares to the general public. 
 
 5-4. The Features of Overseas Expansion of ZTE 
 ① The replica of domestic marketing strategy in China 
ZTE advanced into developing countries and areas such as southern Asia 
and Africa at first, then extended to Russia, India and Brazil, which are all 
emerging countries. Finally, ZTE entered into the developed markets like 
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Europe, America and Japan. During this process, ZTE copied its domestic 
marketing strategy that was called “From Rural to City” in China. This paper 
expresses the strategy as “Reversed Direction Strategy”. This means the 
strategy is different from the preceding MNE’s one, and can be described as 
“from the periphery to the center, from the poorer countries and areas to the 
richer ones, from the lower end to the higher one”. 
Following the chronological sequences, we found that ZTE began to create 
overseas outlets and gain experience through doing international business 
since the latter half of the 1990s. After learning the rules of doing business in 
emerging countries between the end of the 1990s and the beginning of 2000, 
ZTE received orders of communication equipment from overseas as well as 
exporting its cell phone units. After 2002, ZTE started its global strategy full-
scale, which included the global markets, the global human resources and the 
global financing. 
 ② Obtaining the specific advantages afterwards 
After successfully receiving some big orders from Bangladesh and Pakistan 
in 1998, ZTE recognized that only the lower price advantage was not adequate 
enough to compete with the world major ICT equipment companies, which had 
the advantages of not only in technology but also in brand image. Thereafter, 
ZTE began to establish research institutes in America, France and Sweden. In 
addition, ZTE made alliances with Intel China (2002), IBM (2003), Microsoft 
China (2003), FT (2006), and so forth. Through this process, ZTE not only 
gained the specific advantage of technology, but also “ZTE” became a well-
known brand in the world. Ultimately, ZTE was ranked one of the top runners 
of ICT companies with the preceding world powers. 
 
6. Conclusions – Implications and the Remaining Issues 
This paper reviewed the early literature regarding the features of Chinese 
enterprises advancing into the overseas markets, especially pointing out the 
features of the “Reverse Direction Strategy”. Furthermore, it focused on the 
communication equipment industry in China especially its top 2 firms －
Huawei and ZTE, and reconfirmed the different features of overseas expansion 
between the CMNEs and the DMNEs. 
Both Huawei & ZTE, have their headquarters in Shen Zhen which is the 
most dynamic area in China, although there are many differences such as in 
ownership, being listed on the stock exchange, and in their corporate culture 8), 
however, there are also lots of similarities such as their initial condition, types 
of products and market preferences between them. Especially, the strategy of 
overseas expansion for the 2 companies is exactly the same, which is the replica 
of their domestic market strategies described as “From Rural to City”. Of course, 
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from the outward overseas process, both Chinese enterprises gained many 
strategic assets including technology and the know-how plus brand image. 
The experiences of Huawei & ZTE in their overseas expansion may give some 
suggestions or hints to other companies in developing countries to extend into 
the global market in the future, because the starting conditions are the same 
between China and other developing countries, and the MNEs in developing 
countries are different from the DMNEs in the overseas expanding purposes, 
the targets and also the original advancing processes. Furthermore, deepening 
the study regarding the developing countries’ companies becoming MNEs will 
also enrich the existing theories of international business administration. 
The top 2 ICT equipment companies in China － Huawei & ZTE－ have 
focused their targets on the developed markets after almost 15 years of 
overseas expansion, and they have also become major ICT firms in the world. 
However, the emergence of MNEs in emerging countries (EMNEs) will also 
create fierce competition between the EMNEs and the DMNEs. Meanwhile, 
this competition between companies could get the governments wrapped in, 
and make the matter more complicated 9). Can Huawei & ZTE, both of CMNEs, 
without so many core technologies, endure the fierce competition or not in the 
future will be a point to focus on. 
This paper expressed the features of CMNEs’ overseas expansion strategies 
as the “Reverse Direction Strategy”. Whether or not the strategy becomes a 
model in general for other EMNEs to advance into global markets, may be an 
issue for further study. 
The Chinese government came out with a new project that was called “One 
Belt & One Road”, a scheme to build the Silk Road Economic Zone in 2013. The 
policies of the Chinese government mostly affects the outward foreign 
expansion of Chinese firms so far, and the new project could affects how the 
CMNEs overseas expansion may change in the near future under the influence 
of the Chinese government, will be the other remaining issue, too. 
 
【Notes】 
 1) The companies in foreign countries included the company in 100% ownership, and 
the company in over 10% shares and have a vote. 
 2) Tian Tao & Wu Chun Bo (2012) Is Huawei gone as the next loser? ZHONG XIN 
Publishing (Beijing), in Chinese. 
 3) Ryoji Nakagawa (2008) “Huawei Technology and Lenovo” in Chinese Multi-national 
Enterprises (Written & Edited by Tomoo Marukawa & Ryoji Nakagawa) Chapter 4, 
DOYUKAN, in Japanese. 
 4) Ryoji Nakagawa, op. cit., p.83. 
 5) Tadayuki Nagashima (2014) “The Diversified Investment from Chinese Firms to 
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Japan” in The Internationalized Strategy with Chinese Firms (Written & Edited by 
Hiroki Oki & Kenji Shimizu) Chapter 16, JETRO, pp.262-276, in Japanese. 
 6) Yong Ge LIU (2014) “The Internationalization Strategy of Chinese Firms: Focusing 
on the ZTE Co. Ltd. Case” KEIEI RONSHU  (Journal of Business Administration) 
No.83, in Japanese. 
 7) From ZTE Annual Report 2016. 
 8) The corporate culture in Huawei and in ZTE are so- called “Wolf Culture” and “Caw 
Culture”, respectively. In this paper I could not state this issue because of the space 
assigned. 
 9) You can see how the American government excluded Huawei and ZTE in the 
American market so far. 
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